Kentucky and Tennessee. He saw that, so long as the Confederates held their positions at Columbus and Bowling Green, and so long as the communications between those places, and also with Nashville, were uninterrupted, an advance from the Ohio to Knoxville would be out of the question,—the line of operations of the invading column would be exposed throughout its whole length to the attack of the unbroken Confederate army. It was clearly necessary to defeat Johnston's army before undertaking the invasion of East Tennessee. The case was altogether different from that of West Virginia, which was a direct advance through a friendly country, and where no Confederate army menaced the line of operations.

Accordingly we find Buell, on November 3, 1861, only three weeks after his arrival at Louisville, when replying to a letter[1] and subsequent telegram[2] from McClellan urging an immediate advance upon East Tennessee, recommending[3] "the movement of two flotilla columns" on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, in conjunction with a land movement on Nashville and an advance into East Tennessee. To this, McClellan, unable to see the vital connection between these operations, replies on the 29th,[4] urging Buell to secure East Tennessee first, and

then, if he possesses the means, to take Nashville. McClellan follows this letter up with another on December 3d,[5] which is an amazing letter for one occupying

[1] 7 W. R., 447.
* /£., 450. * 74., 450, 451.
[4] 7*., 457- [5] •#•. 463.